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The Growing Prevalence of Emergency,
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Program Payments: Implications for Agri-
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Katherine R. Smith
The use of emergency, disaster, and other ad hoc sources of income support to American farmers
escalated dramatically between 1991 and 2002, increasing year-to-year uncertainty about the magni-
tude and distribution of farm program benefits. Ad hoc payment mechanisms, while meeting needs
now apparently unsatisfied by other farm programs, have the potential to substitute for or conflict
with agri-environmental and conservation program goals. Federal budget constraints likely make con-
tinued growth in ad hoc payment schemes unsustainable, raising questions about what will take their
place. There is ample room for new research on how alternative farm program approaches and program
combinations interact to affect stewardship behavior and associated agri-environmental outcomes.
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The idea of supporting the livelihood of American
farmers has been advocated since Thomas Jeffer-
son’s administration, though the predominate forms
of and mechanisms for income support have varied
greatly over time. During our nation’s first century,
agriculture was boosted through subsidized devel-
opment of an agriculturally oriented infrastructure.
Tariffs helped support domestic prices for commod-
ities in the 1800s. Direct farm commodity price-
support programs were enacted in the early years of
the Great Depression. Supply control mechanisms
were added to price supports as part of the Roose-
velt Administration’s New Deal, and survived until
provisions of the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improve-
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ment and Reform (FAIR) Act began a process of
“decoupling” farm payments from commodity pro-
duction.
Policy reform in American agriculture has been
a difficult process (Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe,
1999), as any radical change requires, in words
attributed to John Jay Chapman, “taking a bone away
from a dog.”
1 To the extent that reforms enacted
since 1996 have reduced potential for automatic
farm income support payments, they may have
created incentives for new ways of transferring
income to farm households and their related stake-
holders.
As we move forward into the 21st century, a lar-
ger and larger proportion of federal support to the
farm sector is coming from sources that anticipate
or react to a potpourri of “emergency” or disaster
situations. From 1991S1997, annual distributions re-
lated to emergencies and disasters averaged roughly
$1.4 billion, while from 1998S2002, the average was
1 The full quote, according to Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, is:
“People who love soft words and hate iniquity forget this; that reform
consists in taking a bone away from a dog.”
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Table 1. Federal Government Payments to Farmers, Absolute Amount and Percentage of Total
Payments, 1991S S S S2002
PROGRAM TYPE
 Traditional Commodity
 a  Conservation















  1991  6.20 73.8 1.87 22.3  0.33   0.9
  1992  6.00 64.0 1.91 20.4  1.46 15.6
  1993  9.82 72.3 1.97 14.5  1.81 13.2
  1994  4.20 51.7 1.99 24.3  1.96 24.0
  1995  4.68 53.0 1.92 23.5  1.57 19.2
  1996  5.32 64.0 1.85 22.2  1.15 13.9
  1997  5.57 63.8 1.74 20.7  1.30 15.5
  1998  7.97 59.8 1.55 11.6  3.81 28.6
  1999 11.96  53.2 1.60   7.1  8.91 39.6
  2000 12.61  52.9 1.66   7.0  9.57 40.1
  2001 10.29  45.7 1.88   8.4 10.33  45.9
  2002  6.80 54.5 1.95 15.4  3.95 31.1
a Includes Deficiency, Diversion, and Loan Deficiency payments, and/or Production Flexibility, Countercyclical, and Direct Program pay-
ments, as well as payments under periodic commodity programs such as the Peanut Quota Buyout. [Source: USDA/Farm Service Agency.]
b Includes payments under the Conservation Reserve Program and federal shares made as payments to producers under a variety of cost-
share programs, such as EQIP, and federal payments for farmland protection. [Sources: USDA/Farm Service Agency; USDA/Natural
Resources Conservation Service.]
c Includes Disaster program payments, payments made under emergency supplemental appropriations, Emergency Conservation Program
payments, karnal bunt and other compensation payments, all Marketing Loss Assistance Program payments, and the federal share of crop
insurance premiums paid, as proxied by the amount of the federal insurance premium subsidy provided by USDA’s Risk Management
Agency to insurance firms in the calendar year. [Sources: USDA/Farm Service Agency; USDA/Risk Management Agency.]
over $7 billion per year. One must question whether
farming has, indeed, become inherently more disas-
ter-prone, or whether other forces are at work in
creating this situation. Taking a closer look at what
sorts of payments and programs comprise these
transferred funds helps in thinking about potential
reasons for the rise in ad hoc payments.
Composition of Federal Farm 
Program Payments
Table 1 reports federal agricultural emergency and
disaster and ad hoc payments to the farm sector as
a proportion of total transfers to farm operators,
households, and landowners. Due to the very nature
of emergency and disaster payments, one would
expect their amounts to fluctuate from year to year.
For example, the large increase seen between 1993
and 1994 can be attributed to payouts for losses
suffered during 1993 floods—a natural disaster for
farming and ranching. However, a trend seems to
be emerging. Between 1991 and 1997, emergency,
disaster, and ad hoc payments represented 14.6% of
total direct payments to producers, on average. By
contrast, these payments represented an average of
37% of all federal government program payments
to farmers in the years 1998S2002. Clearly, emer-
gency, disaster, and ad hoc payments are playing a
larger part in supplementing cash returns to produc-
tion in recent years.
Figure 1 shows the composition of this growing
proportion of emergency, disaster, and other ad hoc
program payments to total payments. The smallest
portion is contributed by Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) emergency program
expenditures, but the rate of growth in APHIS emer-
gency-related payments is particularly illustrative.
The average annual amount paid to producers in the
form of indemnifications for animals destroyed or
compensation for destroyed plants falling under an
“extraordinary” plant protection and quarantine
emergency, went from $10.4 million in 1991S1995,
to $131.7 million in 1996S2001. In the last three
years for which data are available (1999S2001), the
average annual expenditure was $232.3 million, an





























In analyzing this pattern, Economic Research
Service economists (Lewandrowski and Roberts,
2003, and colleagues) have found some evidence
that the prices of commodities for which producers
receive compensation are negatively correlated with
APHIS payments over time and/or space, at least
for karnal bunt, citrus canker, and plum pox com-
pensation payments—suggesting market forces may
be influencing the designation of pest emergency
situations.
The most variable year-to-year component of
total emergency, disaster, and ad hoc payments are
those payments originating with the Farm Service
Agency (FSA) under existing legislative authority.
These programs, including the Emergency Conser-
vation, Crop Disaster, Emergency Feed, Livestock
Emergency Assistance, Dairy Indemnity, Noninsured
Assistance, Disaster Reserve, and general Disaster
programs, are intentionally appropriated as back-
stops against unanticipated events. They operate
only under predetermined conditions constituting
an unexpected natural disaster or emergency which
is weather, disease, or pest related, and which can be
documented by those applying for assistance. The
Noninsured Assistance program covers producers
of crops who are not covered by insurance, while
the other programs apply to insured and noninsured
alike. Provision of disaster assistance to uninsured
as well as insured producers persists despite peri-
odic efforts by some in the Federal Legislative and
Executive branches to reduce disaster payments to
crop producers by tying eligibility to the purchase
of insurance, or in other ways increasing consistency
among programs (Glauber and Collins, 2002).
Insurance premium subsidies, which, on average,
over time, are basically equivalent to the federal
share of indemnity payments made to producers,
have steadily increased as the number of commodi-
ties covered by insurance options has expanded,
and the portion of the premium covered by federal
subsidies has risen. The number of crops covered
doubled between 1990 and 2000. Large increases in
the premium subsidy level occurred in 1994 and
2000. The consequential rising payments are repre-
sented by the “RMA” portions of the bars in figure 1.
But the big “bump” in emergency, disaster, and
ad hoc payments is observed after passage of the
1996 FAIR Act. Between 1998 and 2003, the
largest single source of supplemental emergency
assistance has been provided to farmers for a
variety of reasons through special acts or as special
additions to normal appropriations. Especially prom-
inent is the designation of “market losses” as an
emergency or disaster. For example, the $5.9 billion
“Emergency and Market Loss Assistance” supple-
mental budget appropriation of 1998 included $2.9
billion to “compensate farmers for the loss of
markets for 1998 crops,” as well as $200 million
for the loss of dairy markets. So begins a recent
history of compensation for specific commodities’
  Figure 1. Composition of emergency, disaster, and ad hoc
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“loss of markets” through federal direct payments
to the producers of those commodities.
Not surprisingly, the commodities covered by
market loss assistance have routinely included those
program crops for which deficiency payment
mechanisms were eliminated by the 1996 FAIR Act.
But an increasing number of other commodities are
being covered as well. A special Agricultural Eco-
nomic Assistance Act of 2001 authorized direct
payments for loss of markets in not only the
traditional program crops, but also soybeans and
other oilseeds, tobacco, peanuts, cottonseed, wool
and mohair, and specialty crops. Northeastern
producers also got noticed in 2001, through author-
ization of $20 million for cranberry market loss,
and “not less than $30 million” to purchase cran-
berry juice concentrate and frozen cranberry juice.
In 2002, apple producers received their own $75
million in appropriations for market losses.
The ($3.1 billion) 2003 Agricultural Assistance
Act provides several striking examples of the extent
to which the designation of compensable losses to
agricultural producers appears to be broadening.
That Act made a $10 million grant to Texas “to
assist agricultural producers who suffered losses
during crop year 2002 due to failure of Mexico to
deliver water to the United States,” and authorized
another several million dollars to reimburse agricul-
tural producers in the vicinity of Malaga, New
Mexico, for losses incurred due to the application
of a particular herbicide by the federal government
on or near their farms. Precedent thus suggests
“disasters” now include circumstances caused by
domestic or foreign governments’ actions, as well
as market conditions and natural events.
Characterizing Recent Trends
Based on the information summarized in table 1
and figure 1, and the preceding discussion, recent
trends in emergency/disaster assistance can be char-
acterized by the following factors:
P Program multiplication;
P Increasingly broad definition of emergencies
and disaster; and
P An ex post, ad hoc, and supplemental nature.
Currently, there are simply more disaster and
emergency programs, even of a traditional nature,
than ever before. The multiplication of eligible
program recipients has been ongoing for federal
crop insurance, but the expansion of potential pay-
ment recipients is a relatively new phenomenon for
crop pest damage compensation programs, for
example.
As Barnett (1999) notes, there is a long history
of increasing levels of assistance and progressively
more liberal eligibility criteria in U.S. agricultural
disaster programs, attributable, in part, to rent-seek-
ing behavior. But expansion beyond “natural” into
market and political sources of disaster is unusual,
if not unprecedented, prior to 1996.
The ex post, ad hoc, budget supplemental char-
acteristics of recent assistance packages make it
more difficult for producers to anticipate exactly
what they might be eligible to receive in any given
year. More rules of the game are subject to year-to-
year variation than under traditional, pre-announced
programs. On the other hand, the fact that an
increasingly broad range of circumstances have
been deemed worthy of compensatory assistance in
recent years may also create expectations on the
part of producers that any source of loss will be
compensated in the future. So, while uncertainty is
increased, there is a possibility the character of cur-
rent trends also shifts risk toward the upside.
Potential Explanations for Growth in
Emergency/Disaster Funding
The traditional explanation for crop insurance
subsidization and disaster assistance to agricultural
producers is market failure due to the inherent riski-
ness of farming and ranching, coupled with risk
aversion by producers. This explanation seems
grossly insufficient in accounting for the recent
growth trend and its characteristics.
One potential explanation for why new defini-
tions of “disaster” may have become necessary is
embodied in the strictures imposed upon farm
assistance by the FAIR Act. As federal programs
coupled to crop production have been phased out
by the FAIR Act, policy makers may be searching
for alternative mechanisms to maintain income
support payments to those farmers who previously
received deficiency payments. To some extent,
Production Flexibility payments do this, but they do
not provide payments consistent with increasing
yields, or costs of production. The possibility that
Market Loss Assistance payments are making these
historical program participants “whole” again is
supported by the observation that market loss
assistance was originally applied only to producers
of those historical program crops (corn, sorghum,
oats, barley, wheat, rice, and cotton) and to dairySmith The Growing Prevalence of Ad Hoc Farm Program Payments   5
producers. Program crops continue to reap the
greatest share of appropriations for market loss
assistance.
Moreover, ad hoc programs, especially Market
Loss Assistance, may be seen as a mechanism for
broadening the distribution of farm income support
beyond program crop producers in response to rent-
seeking behavior. Livestock and specialty crop pro-
ducers, for the first time in a long history of farm
programs, now receive market-based relief from the
federal government. In fact, the concept of market
loss assistance is a rent seeker’s dream. Groups
seeking inclusion in the program have ample incen-
tive and an increasing array of examples on which
to base their arguments for inclusion.
Innes (2003) sums up one motivation for broadly
defined disaster relief as “politically optimal obfus-
cation.” Politically obscured policies are defined as
inefficient transfers which promote lawmakers as
well-meaning, while obscuring income redistribution
to politically favored groups. It is not difficult to
envision federal agricultural emergency, disaster,
and ad hoc payments in this light. Helping out in
times of emergency provides a halo effect, regard-
less of the efficiency and distributional consequen-
ces it engenders.
Implications for Agri-Environmental and
Conservation Programs
If the present trend of increasing proportions of farm
support being provided in the form of emergency,
disaster, and ad hoc payments continues, one can
imagine a number of direct and indirect effects on
agri-environmental and conservation programs’
support and effectiveness. The most immediate
direct effect is simply that, in a constrained budget
universe (which usually characterizes the Congress
during times of large-scale federal budget deficit),
transfers flowing from one source will offset or
substitute for transfers flowing from another source.
In other words, disaster/emergency/ad hoc program
funds are substitutes for agri-environmental and
conservation program funds.
If, as casual empiricism suggests, the revealed
preference of federal lawmakers is to assure more
and more broadly distributed agricultural producers
receive income support, and if one assumes that
“green” payments can provide income support, then
the two program types are direct substitutes. If the
motivation for increased emergency funding is
politically optimal obfuscation, and it is more diffi-
cult to tailor the distribution of agri-environmental/
conservation program funds to politically important
rent seekers, then they are imperfect substitutes. In
either case, reference to the statistics reported in
table 1 reveals conservation payments as a propor-
tion of total federal payments to farmers have
dropped as the proportion of disaster, emergency,
and ad hoc payments has increased.
Perhaps more indicative of the substitution effect
are the provisions of recent supplemental budget
laws. The 2001 Supplemental Appropriations Act
diverted $45 million rescinded from the Agricul-
tural Conservation Program to provide ad hoc fund-
ing for a variety of purposes. The 2003 Agricultural
Assistance Act assured no net new cost by trans-
ferring $3.1 billion out of the recently authorized
Conservation Security Program to cover the supple-
mental (mostly market loss assistance) emergency
funding.
Indirect Effects
Indirect effects of increasing emergency funding on
agri-environmental goals and conservation programs
are likely more substantial than any direct effects.
These indirect effects arise from circumstantial evi-
dence indicating emergency/disaster payments will
affect agri-environmental quality in manners similar
to that demonstrated for crop insurance, and from
the potential influences of compensation for politi-
cal “disasters” on the proclivity for and effective-
ness of environmental regulation.
The conflicts between subsidized crop insurance
and agri-environmental quality are well docu-
mented. Subsidized crop insurance distorts produc-
tion practices on land in production by increasing
the use of risk-increasing inputs and potentially
decreasing the use of risk-reducing inputs (Horowitz
and Lichtenberg, 1993; Quiggen, 1992). Overall,
the use of all types of inputs is likely to rise because
the revenue-enhancing character of subsidized crop
insurance induces an increase in acreage (Chambers
and Quiggen, 2001). The dominating extensive
margin effects of subsidized crop insurance on crop
mix and the location of production are especially
critical to environmental quality related to nonpoint
source pollution (Wu, 1999). Insurance availability
at less than an actuarially based premium rate en-
courages production of crops which pose inherently
higher risk to the environment, and further
encourages production in areas where comparative
advantage is lower than would be observed in the
absence of subsidized insurance. These low
comparative advantage sites are associated with high6   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
environmental risk when the source of production
risk comes from weather volatility, storm severity,
a pest- or disease-conducive environment, or soil
fragility.
Whether emergency, disaster, and ad hoc pro-
gram payments are complements to or substitutes
for crop insurance, increases in their use can be
expected to mimic the adverse environmental
quality aspects of subsidized insurance. They
perform similar revenue-enhancement and risk-
reducing functions, as does crop insurance. Even if
the payments given to producers under emergency
authority are more wealth-enhancing than risk-
reducing, the emerging expectation of their receipt
may, for risk-averse producers, increase risky
production activity (as per findings of Chavas and
Holt, 1990). Such effects are likely for Market Loss
Assistance (MLA) payments which, because they
are tied to market conditions, have an insurance
effect as well as a wealth effect (Adams et al.,
2001). While their effect on net production is likely
to be minimal, the environmental implications of
where and how production takes place in this new
MLA payment situation have yet to be investigated.
There is potentially a self-perpetuating and
inherently accelerating nature to the bundle of
emergency, disaster, and ad hoc programs emerging
in the late 1990s, at least in the short run. If
expectations of MLA payments encourage more
risky production activity, more natural losses, as
well as market-based losses, will be perpetuated;
these, in turn, may lead to greater crop insurance
payouts. Basically, there could be fewer and fewer
risk-based moderating influences on even risk-
averse producers’ choices, making “disasters” of all
types more likely, and politically motivated rescue
actions through ad hoc measures ever more neces-
sary. From an agri-environmental standpoint, this is
particularly critical in light of the observation that
conservation program funding may decrease as a
result of its acting as a substitute for emergency/
disaster and ad hoc funding. There may well be a
situation in which a growing need emerges to fund
programs supporting environmentally friendly
farming, while the availability of funds for such
purposes diminishes.
On the other hand, even as environmental risk in-
creases, broadening the definitions of “emergency”
and “disaster” to include the adverse outcomes of
government actions may also make environmental
regulation more likely (or at least more palatable).
Consider, as an example, the Klamath River case.
In 2001, regulatory requirements of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) led to the diversion of Klamath
River Basin water from agricultural uses to wildlife
protection. Producers dependent on irrigation lost
revenue as a result. Under the 2001 Supplemental
Appropriations Act (Section 2104), however, the
government’s actions in carrying out federal ESA
law were deemed an emergency requiring compen-
sation to farmers in the region. Thus, $20 million in
financial assistance was authorized in payments to
producers in the Klamath Basin. Another way of
looking at this example is that a “taking” was given
back.
If negative repercussions for agricultural produ-
cers of environmental regulation are eliminated via
emergency/disaster payments, the probability of en-
acting new environmental legislation, or enforcing
existing laws more forcefully, would seem greater
than in the absence of compensation for economic
“disasters” arising from government actions. Alter-
natively, if compensating for “takings” is perceived
to increase the cost of environmental regulation,
budgetary pressure could lessen support for envi-
ronmental regulation. In either case, once again,
any loss of conservation funding through a “substi-
tution” effect with emergency/disaster funding will
have an impact because agricultural conservation
programs can substitute for environmental legisla-
tion, or complement it (as, for instance, dedication
of Environmental Quality Incentive Program funds
to livestock-producing recipients complements
EPA’s enacting new Clean Water Act regulations
that affect confined animal operations).
Conclusions and Future Policy 
Analytical Needs
Clearly, ad hoc emergency/disaster assistance is
meeting some need(s) that other programs do not
satisfy. But growth in the programs providing this
assistance, through addition of eligible producers
and increasingly liberal interpretation of what con-
stitutes an emergency/disaster, is ultimately unsus-
tainable over the long run in a budget-constrained
world. Agricultural and resource economists have
roles to play in better understanding the political
economy in which the trends described herein arise,
and in designing replacement policy mechanisms.
Basic research to determine the political prefer-
ences revealed through the resultant distribution of
ad hoc emergency/disaster funds would help
identify what has been motivating the increase in
use of this producer payment mechanism, and
define the distributional criteria that would have toSmith The Growing Prevalence of Ad Hoc Farm Program Payments   7
be addressed in some way by any new payment
policy scheme. Then, the agri-environmental as
well as agricultural economic impacts of alternative
means of meeting revealed preferences could be
assessed and compared.
Various policy responses to the trends discussed
above are getting discussion from the agricultural
economics community. Some pundits (e.g., Ray, De
la Torre Ugarte, and Tiller, 2003) propose a return
to supply control as the means to escape the
political dilemmas posed by the combination of
FAIR Act constraints and budget deficit limits on
spending. Innes (2003), who models, in a political
economy framework, “the government’s ex post
urge to bail out farmers in times of financial dis-
tress” as a constraint on the design of efficient ex
ante government farm policy, advances a different
approach. Asking how the government can design
an ex ante farmer insurance program that eliminates
any political incentive for ex post relief, and raises
economic welfare, Innes suggests a customized rev-
enue insurance scheme backed up by output subsi-
dies which counter the underproduction incentives
created by government revenue assurance else-
where. While addressing distributional issues nicely,
this scheme has untested, potentially strong impli-
cations for agri-environmental quality that warrant
further study. Green payment programs offer yet
another ex ante strategy which could be designed to
meet environmental objectives as well as political
objectives. But, as Claassen et al. (2001) point out,
the tradeoffs between farm income and environ-
mental goals could be very hard to balance in con-
templating such a design.
All in all, the combination of long-standing farm
support patterns, newly satisfied groups of agricul-
tural rent seekers, continued agri-environmental
problems, and complex political preferences in a
risky environment, poses great challenges to policy
makers and those whose analysis informs them.
There is ample room for clever thinking on the part
of our profession regarding policy adjustment
possibilities and the economic and environmental
implications of each alternative.
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